Treehoppers (Tylopelta gibbera) are small sap-feeding insects that live on plant stems. Treehoppers communicate by vibrations traveling along the stem, branches and leaves of their host plant. Male treehoppers produce sex-and species-specific 'whine/pulse' patterns, which, under suitable conditions, elicit low frequency 'drone' responses from females. Upon sensing her reply, the male begins searching for the stationary female, crawling up stems and branches, continuing to signal, and waiting for the female's response. When all goes well, the male eventually locates the female and they mate. However, if another male is present on the plant, he too signals, and a race begins. The female responds to both males, and mates with the first one that arrives. In such situations, competing males often produce a second 'masking' signal, simultaneous with the rival's whine/ pulse. This suppresses the female's response, impeding the masked male's search.
Most scientists would be happy to concede that male treehopper whine/ pulses and female drones are 'signals' conveying 'information' about the presence and location of a conspecific, and that the male and female influence each other via these signals, in a way that is, on average, beneficial to both. But what of the second male's jamming signal? Clearly it influences the female (presumably to the benefit of the masker and detriment of the maskee). But does it carry information? Is it a 'signal' at all? What of the related thornhopper (Figure ) , which looks remarkably like a thorn -is this disguise a 'signal' designed to mislead For example, even once an entire vervet troop has seen the predator and is safely up a tree, they continue to call. Such research demonstrates that the assumption of parity that comes to us naturally, as language users, fails to apply to other primates, as Cheney and Seyfarth have consistently reminded their readers [2] .
Of course, specialists in biology are well aware of the dangers of importing the connotations of terms like 'information', 'meaning', 'honesty', 'cheating' and the like into scholarly discourse, partly due to the heated discussions surrounding such phenomena as 'ant slavery' or 'rape by ducks'. By my reading, the pro-information authors in this volume are consistently clear that they use the term 'information' in a restricted technical sense borrowed from information theory. For clarity, I will denote this term as information hereafter, where it denotes the reduction in uncertainty occurring in a suitably equipped receiver upon reception of a signal. This probabilistic quantity can be quantified in terms of bits (binary digits), a measure so familiar in today's digital world that it is easy to forget that Shannon introduced it in the engineering context of signal transmission []. Shannon and his colleagues were adamant that information is not the same thing as meaning or relevance, and Shannon deplored the tendency of many to conflate them and thus overstate the reach of information theory [3] .
information is in the eye of the beholder -one man's signal is another man's noise -and in its technical sense sheds most linguistic connotations attached to the term (e.g. that information in a signal implies a conscious intent to 'inform' on the part of the signaler). Whether information is relevant to a receiver depends on context, not just information content: a female red deer shows little response to a stag's roar until she is ovulating, but during this brief period exhibits a phonotactic response to roars [4] . Nonetheless, non-estrous females are almost certainly sensitive to the information that roars indicate the presence of stags, even if they show no reaction. Most biologists understand that use of information demands care, and respect for its restricted, technical meaning [5] . By and large, the informationists in this volume live up to this challenge, clearly stating that they are discussing information rather than language, meaning, representation, relevance or other more loaded and ambiguous terms.
Adopting extreme influentialism would neglect a long tradition of using information to quantify core issues in animal communication. For example, Haldane and Spurway calculated that the dance of a forager honeybee contains, in principle, about 5 bits of information concerning flower location, of which only half are used effectively by signal recipients. The chapters by Colin Allen and Michael Lachmann also provide nice examples of the value of this technical approach. In the neighboring discipline of neuroscience, information theory has come to play a central role [6] . In some systems, like fly vision, we can now measure the metabolic cost of information at a cellular level, in terms of ATP molecules per bit [7] . These and many other cases belie the strong claim in the chapter by Rendall and Owren that "whether they know it or not, researchers relying on information … are implicitly positing that signals are representational in nature." While they are correct to warn of the dangers of unconscious implications when using words -the price of metaphor is eternal vigilance -they are wrong to think that clarity can be obtained by banning words. information is more than a metaphor, and outside of primatology, there seems to be little confusion about whether and when the term is being used in its useful technical sense. Indeed, such usage helps build needed bridges to other disciplines like neuroscience, ecology, engineering and physics. Posing 'influence' and 'information' as opposed dichotomous concepts, as the extreme influentialists do, creates a false dichotomy. Thus, for understanding animal communication, information is not the problem, it is part of the cure.
But this debate is only the first (and indeed the easiest) of the problems tackled in this volume -the more difficult issues concern the question of how to properly define a 'signal' or indeed 'communication' in animal communication research. Many attempts to do so rely on evolutionary, adaptive logic: we should call something a 'signal' only when, on average over evolutionary time it produces effects that are beneficial to the signaler [8] . This ultimate evolutionary perspective is adopted by many in the Stegmann volume. But Haven Wiley's chapter offers a proximate, mechanistic definition: "a signal is any pattern of energy or matter that evokes a response without providing all of the power for that response". This very broad definition has the virtue of being directly testable, and of allowing for learned signals to be included. If after some time in France one learns that saying (or hearing) "il pleut" signifies "it's raining", this is just as surely a signal as is my (unlearned) laughter or crying. But the phrase itself has no biologically adaptive history. For learned animal signals, like birdsong, this is an important issue to keep in mind. However, Wiley's definition seems overly broad. It would make the fly's movement or sounds a 'signal' to an insectivorous predator, and would include signals generated by inanimate sources. Lightning, smoke, or the crack of a falling tree, which most biologists or psychologists would term 'stimuli', would all be 'signals' by Wiley's proximate definition.
And what of the treehopper's jamming signal, which functions to deter a response by females, and hinder localization by males (discussed in the Horisk & Cocroft chapter)? For this to be termed a signal, a rather broad definition of 'response' would be needed, one including 'negative' responses. Similarly, for the thorn bug, we might agree that the camouflage bears the misleading information "there is a thorn here", thus constituting a (deceptive) signal by Wiley's definition (the hungry bird concludes, wrongly, that the retinal image contains a thorn). But is this 'communication'? Among influentialists, there is ongoing debate about whether attention should focus mainly on signalers or receivers. The correct answer is probably "both" [9] . The chapters in this volume reveal little consensus regarding these, and many other, interesting questions.
Despite numerous virtues, Wiley's proximate definition of 'signal' would seem inadequate to many researchers interested in the evolution of communication. A prominent issue in this subfield is the question of 'honesty' in signals: under what conditions do signals provide perceivers with accurate information about the signaler, or the world? Evolutionary interests of signalers and receivers may often be different, leading to a constant selection for exaggeration and "dishonest" signaling (in this context, these terms carry no connotation of conscious deception). When signalers are, on average, deceptive, this should select for perceivers who ignore them [0] , leading some to claim that only signals whose honesty is underwritten by a large 'handicap' cost to the signaler can be stable over evolutionary time []. But this claim is now known to be overly broad, since honesty without handicaps can exist either when the interests of signaler and receiver roughly coincide, or if signal accuracy is underwritten by physical constraints (e.g. if only large animals can produce low-frequency resonances [2] ). Such theoretical discussions require terminology that goes beyond proximate mechanisms, framing signaling as an adaptation in the strict Darwinian sense.
This proximate versus ultimate debate is another false dichotomy, and the pluralistic perspective laid out by Tinbergen [3] provides the best way forward. Tinbergen emphasized that there is no conflict between ultimate and proximate explanations in biology, and that full understanding requires biologists to seek answers to both types of questions. In favor of mechanism, it is easier to observe a perceiver's response to a signal than to rigorously determine if a particular signal is an adaptation: adaptation is an 'onerous concept' to be invoked only after plausible alternatives have been ruled out [4] . Nonetheless, a rich understanding of animal communication requires us to develop and test adaptive hypotheses about ultimate function. There is thus no real conflict between the diverse ultimate and proximate approaches to signaling adopted in this volume.
In summary, this is an extremely thought-provoking book that broadly captures the current state of play in these multiple ongoing debates. The diversity of opinions, each concisely expressed in relatively short chapters, is its key virtue. While many key issues are opened but not resolved, the book would provide an excellent focus for a discussion-oriented seminar on animal communication. For biologists studying animal communication, many chapters will be required reading, because they clarify that considerable work is still needed to place communication research on a firm theoretical foundation with clear consensus about terminology and practice. The volume raises and clarifies, without answering, numerous questions that any future theoretical framework must successfully address. What inspired you to become a scientist? My inspiration to search for answers to the unknown in science came from the popular science books that I read as a child. Books were hard to find in the countryside of China when I was a child, but I was lucky to borrow a popular science series for children, entitled 100,000 WHYs from my neighbor. I was glued to these books and finished reading them in one day. I was captivated by what nature presents and how scientists discover the underlying principles for natural occurrences. From then on, I dreamt of exploring the mysteries behind the fascinating nature that surrounds us
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